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Introduction: Social security and the challenge of demographic change 
From 29 November to 4 December 2010, the International Social Security Association (ISSA) 
will meet in Cape Town, Republic of South Africa, to mark the event of the ISSA World Social 
Security Forum. The Forum provides a unique opportunity for decision-makers from all regions 
to share knowledge, recognize good practices and discuss key policy challenges as these relate to 
the design and delivery of national social security programmes. One key policy challenge 
identified by the ISSA’s worldwide membership is demographic change. For this important 
reason, among the events planned for the Cape Town Forum, a plenary will focus specifically on 
demography. 
To coincide with the preparations for the World Forum, and to complement the wider and 
longer-term endeavours of the ISSA to promote knowledge sharing, the International Social 
Security Review has chosen to produce this double special issue on “Social security and the 
challenge of demographic change”.
1
The demographic context 
  The expectation is that this set of papers will make a 
contribution to supporting social security policy-makers, practitioners, analysts and researchers 
in all countries as they work towards developing and implementing tailored policy responses to 
the multifaceted challenge of demographic change. 
The world is undergoing demographic change, and population ageing is a central element of that. 
Population ageing, defined as the growth of older age groups (aged 60 or older; aged 80 or older) 
                                                 
1. This is an early draft of a paper prepared for a special issue “Social security and the challenge of demographic 
change” of the International Social Security Review (Vol. 63, No.3-4, 2010). The definitive version is available at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com. 
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as shares of the total population, is occurring in all regions of the world. In particular, Figures 1-
3 show the percentage of population aged 60 or older by region for the period 1950 to 2050; the 
percentage  of population aged 80 or older by region for the period 1950 to 2050; and life 
expectancy by region for the period 1950 to 2050.
2 Overall, the number of individuals aged 60 or 
older is projected to reach 1 billion by 2020 and will approach 2 billion by 2050, representing 22 
per cent of the world’s population. The number of the “oldest-old” (aged 80 or older) is projected 
to rise from around 90 million today to more than 400 million in 2050, representing 4 per cent of 
the global population by 2050. Remarkably, global life expectancy has increased from 47 years 
in the early 1950s to 68 years in 2010, and is expected to reach 75 years by 2045. This process of 
population ageing is historically unprecedented; however, the phenomenon is not uniform across 
countries. The extent of ageing varies most between the more- and less-developed regions.
3
                                                 
2. The United Nations Population Division collects and synthesizes the data shown in these graphs. The figures 
through 2005 are based on actual data. The UN bases its population projections on a model that takes into account 
fertility, mortality and migration. Fertility projections are derived from the current fertility rate, recent changes in 
that rate in a given country, the historical pace of fertility decline in a wide range of countries, and a rate to which all 
countries are expected to eventually converge. All projections starting in 2010 used in this article are based on the 
UN’s medium-variant fertility scenario. Mortality projections are derived from a model that assumes that life 
expectancy will increase less rapidly in countries where it is already high. Recent country- and sex-specific trends 
are taken into account, as are the effects of HIV/AIDS. Migration trends are assumed to follow past patterns, as 
potentially modified by current immigration policies. The UN’s methodology is described in detail in “Assumptions 
Underlying the Results of the 2008 Revision of World Population Prospects”, 
<
 In 
the most-developed countries, one-fifth of the population is already aged 60 or older, with the 
expectation that this share will rise to more than 30 per cent by 2050. In many developing 
countries, less than 10 per cent of the population is aged 60 or older. Although the pace at which 
different populations will age also varies, the proportion of those aged 60 or older in developing 
countries is projected to at least double in the coming four decades. For example, by 2050, those 
aged 60 or older will represent 20 per cent and 30 per cent of the populations of India and the 
People’s Republic of China, respectively. For all countries, more- and less-developed alike, the 
recognized phenomenon of elderly females outnumbering elderly males will continue, albeit in a 
http://esa.un.org/unpp/assumptions.html>. 
3. The distinction here follows the practice of the United Nations Population Division.   3 
less pronounced manner than in the past. As a consequence of improvements in health at all ages, 
the male death rate is expected to decline.
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4. This section borrows heavily from Bloom, Canning and Fink (2010).   4 
Figure 2. Share of population aged 80 or older, by region 
   5 
Figure 3. Life expectancy at birth, by region 
 
Three main factors serve to explain past and projected changes in the share of the population 
aged 60 or older. Declining fertility rates is the first, because this change reduces the proportion 
of young people in relation to the elderly. An increase in life expectancy is a second factor, and 
is seen both in developed and developing countries. On a global scale, this trend prevails despite 
the negative impact of the HIV and AIDS pandemic in some low- and middle-income countries 
and also despite a decrease in life expectancy, particularly among males, in some countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s. The third main factor 
is past variations in birth and death rates. The impact of the ageing of the post-Second World 
War “baby boom” generation on high-income country population pyramids is an excellent 
example in this regard. Similarly, advances in primary and maternity care in developing 
countries that contribute to improved maternal and child survival and subsequent temporary 
increases in fertility rates will inevitably lead to a bulge in the numbers of the elderly as these 
cohorts age.   6 
It is important to note that these outlined demographic changes are taking place in the context of 
existing social security laws, institutional structures and benefits programmes. Although the 
scale and scope of social security provision can vary greatly between countries, the demographic 
changes already in play will affect nearly all countries significantly, with  ramifications for 
national labour markets. That the most predominant mechanism for financing social security 
worldwide remains social insurance, wherein covered workers and their employers are mandated 
to pay contributions, demographic change that leads to a decline in the size of the formal labour 
market is likely to have a negative impact on the financing of social security provision. This is 
especially so for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social insurance programmes, where current 
contribution revenue from the active population (workers and employers) is the main source of 
income used to finance current benefit expenditure destined for the non-active population. In the 
worst-case scenario, if the ratio of active contributors to current beneficiaries declines to a point 
where the value of expenditures on beneficiaries exceeds the value of income from contributors, 
then, in the absence of sufficient other income from reserve funds, returns on investments or 
State subsidies, the PAYG programme will be unable to meet its commitment to finance current 
benefits. However, such a possible eventuality is not restricted to the impact of demographic 
change alone. Financial disequilibrium can also result from contribution evasion and 
underpayment, in particular if this coincides with structural changes to the labour market that 
lead to high levels of unemployment and/or a serious decline in the size of the covered active 
population. For example, in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, large-scale informal 
employment has contributed to the current very low ratio of active social security contributors to 
pensioners (1.25:1). As a comparative measure, this current ratio is lower than the projected ratio 
for the countries of the European Union (EU) once the baby boom generation has retired (1.4:1) 
(ISSA, 2010a). 
Important questions for national social security programmes 
Financial disequilibria of the kind found in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina should be viewed 
as extreme events. More generally, to explain the common challenges for  social security 
programmes that derive from current global patterns of demographic change, three main 
elements must be considered: increased longevity, falling rates of fertility, and evolving 
migration flows. The papers in the issue collectively draw attention to the potential impact of   7 
these elements on the functioning of national social security programmes. In turn, this 
necessarily leads to a series of important questions, the responses to which will vary according to 
the country or particular type of programme in question. 
•  To what degree will demographic change negatively impact the capacity of societies to 
adequately finance existing social security programmes through risk-pooling social 
insurance contributions, the allocation of tax revenues by government, and mandated 
individual savings? 
•  To what degree will demographic change negatively impact capacities to adequately finance 
the implementation of new social security programmes, not only for the vast majority of the 
global population who are currently inadequately protected but to address the evolving and 
new income protection, health and long-term care needs of populations in ageing societies? 
•  To what degree can existing social security programmes, which were largely designed for 
the family structures, social needs and lifecycle risks of populations of the second-half of the 
twentieth century, be considered appropriate and equitable for the family structures, social 
needs and lifecycle risks faced by modern, increasingly mobile, populations? 
•  To what degree might the ageing of national workforces, including the ageing of public 
servants, impact the effective day-to-day administration and delivery  of social security 
programmes? 
•  To what degree might demographic change negatively impact political commitment and 
public attitudes towards social solidarity, the core value underpinning social security 
programmes? 
There is a significant element of uncertainty surrounding the answers to all the above questions. 
For many Member States of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in particular, such uncertainty as regards how to adequately finance social security 
programmes in the coming decades is not a new one. Notably, this question was broached by the 
International Labour Office (ILO) in relation to Europe as early as 1987, with findings 
subsequently published in 1989 in a volume entitled From pyramid to pillar: Population change 
and social security in Europe (ILO, 1989). The ILO reported that an awareness of the challenges 
posed by demographic ageing trends for European social security programmes had arisen   8 
initially in the 1950s. The ILO underlined, however, that the “concern” (ILO, 1989, p. 85) voiced 
in the 1950s about population ageing had not resulted in policy action, particularly the reform of 
pension systems. Across Europe, successive incumbent governments appeared unwilling to 
tackle the tricky issue of pension reform, especially when the problem to be addressed lay 
decades in the future. It would not be until after the oil shocks of the 1970s, a period marked by 
recession and high levels of unemployment, that the question of the cost of social security would 
become important and the general public would become truly aware of the challenges of 
demography for social security financing (ILO, 1989, p. 86). It is plausible to suggest that 
despite this rise in awareness in the 1970s, some governments nevertheless opted to continue to 
side-step the demographic challenge – a challenge that could still be comfortably ignored and left 
to a future generation of politicians. 
In more recent years, it is possible to discern a similar pattern of events. A full five years after 
the ILO released From pyramid to pillar,  the World Bank published its influential policy 
research report Averting the old age crisis (1994). Challenging the policy vision adhered to by 
the ILO,
5
                                                 
5. Amongst other issues, the perspectives of the two international organizations may be differentiated on the grounds 
of the relative importance accorded to collective risk-pooling vis-à-vis individual responsibility; the relative 
importance of ensuring, at least, minimum “standards” of retirement income for all throughout the duration of 
retirement; the respective and relative roles of public agencies and private institutions responsible for pension 
administration and fund management; and the relative mix  of general tax revenue, pay-as-you-go, and fully-
prefunded financing mechanisms. 
  the Bank’s promotional message that accompanied the release of the report was 
deliberately sensationalist and headline-grabbing: “existing systems of financial security for old 
people are headed toward collapse”. While the Bank’s policy conclusions have been, and remain, 
the focus of serious contention, Averting  made a major positive contribution to taking 
discussions of the demographic challenge out of highly specialized technical meetings and 
placing them, more firmly than ever, in the public realm. Since 1994, the different responses 
offered by the ILO and the World Bank to the challenge of demographic change and to the social 
policy needs of older populations have continued to evolve, including greater policy focus by 
both of them on poverty reduction. At the national level over recent years, reforms to strengthen 
the longer-term health of pension system finances have been commonplace. In spite of all this,   9 
and remaining mindful of the fact that the recession years of the 1970s did not result in 
significant structural change in a majority of countries’ social security systems, it remains to be 
seen in what manner the most recent serious macroeconomic shock may provide the necessary 
catalyst to transform heightened political awareness of demographic change into active and 
sustained political will.  
It also remains to be seen whether increasing pressure for greater fiscal control will act to limit 
what is financially possible for political actors in terms of feasible reform options. For instance, 
it is often argued that structural pension system reforms involving the introduction of mandatory 
individual accounts (MIAs) may be one way to address the predicted financial challenge posed 
by population ageing for the sustainability of conventional defined benefit PAYG pension 
systems. Such reform, resulting in the creation of a multi-pillar pension system,
6 is aimed at 
reducing the role of the PAYG pension "pillar". However, it also involves high transition costs 
over several decades. An important element of the transition costs are the public subsidies that 
must be allocated to the “old” PAYG pillar. Specifically, with a portion of pension contributions 
diverted to the “new” MIA system (which implies a commensurate fall in contribution revenue 
for the PAYG system), public subsidies are necessary to finance adequately the defined benefits 
of current pensioners and, in future years to come, of older workers (usually, those aged 40 or 
older at the time of the reform) who are excluded from the MIA system. It is not yet clear 
whether, in the current generalized context of reduced fiscal leeway, these transition costs will 
challenge arguments in support of the MIA option and make reforms aimed at strengthening the 
financial health of existing defined benefit PAYG programmes more fiscally and, indeed, 
politically attractive.
7
                                                 
6. See Bloom et al. in this issue for an outline of the evolution of the World Bank’s multi-pillared pension system 
model. 
 
7. PAYG system reform options include raising retirement ages; equalizing the retirement ages of men and women; 
increasing the number of years of contributions required to qualify for a full pension; removing incentives to earlier 
retirement; linking individual benefits more closely to the value of individual contributions paid; and reducing the 
expected rate that future benefits will increase, by switching to indexation based on prices rather than wage growth, 
or by using composite indexes using measures of both.   10 
Certainty and uncertainty regarding population ageing and social security systems 
Population ageing is now a reality in most societies, and thus it is no longer merely a looming 
problem on the longer-term political horizon that may be conveniently or easily ignored. As a 
consequence of post-2008 public spending cuts and, in some countries of Europe, moves towards 
fiscal austerity, the time may finally have come for sustained and meaningful political action to 
address the challenge demographic change presents to different national social security 
programmes and systems. But this is far from certain, given the last sixty years of political 
debate on this issue. One thing is sure, however. If politicians do not act at least as quickly as one 
would hope, it will not be because the trends of demographic projections can be doubted. 
It is sometimes suggested that projecting demographic change is, at best, an inexact science, 
wherein even the smallest of changes in initial input variables necessarily demand that 
projections require revision. This view is certainly not wrong, but it seriously overestimates the 
degree of error found in demographic projections. To the contrary, accurately projecting the 
broad direction of demographic trends may be considered more straightforward and sure than is 
the case for projecting other social and economic changes. For instance, making projections 
based on the limited number of key parameters of demographic change (e.g. the death rate, the 
fertility rate and migration flows) can be more confidently done, and consistently so, than is this 
case for projections anticipating changes to, for example, the myriad interwoven factors that 
contribute to the growth rates and productivity of national economies. When the subprime crisis 
occurred in the United States in 2007, few would have been able to confidently project the 
subsequent negative social and economic effects that have since impacted the global economy 
and, even more so, specific national economies. 
Accordingly, and despite the sensitivity of demographic projections to even small changes in 
variables, they nonetheless enable a degree of certainty in projections about population changes. 
For example, from a global perspective, it can be stated with certainty that the absolute and 
relative number of older individuals will increase. It can be stated with certainty that within the 
global population, the relative number of children will decrease. It is also certain that, 
increasingly, a greater proportion of the world’s population will live in cities.   11 
However, as regards the impact of demographic change on the future nature and roles of social 
security programmes there is a relative degree of uncertainty. Already at the level of social 
security institutions, an important challenge is often a lack of robust data profiling all scheme 
members and their dependants. This is particularly true for developing countries where 
institutional capacities to collect contributions and disburse benefits in an effective and efficient 
manner may also be weak. All things being equal, these challenges have a direct bearing on 
efforts to ensure that benefit programmes remain adequately financed. However, when 
demographic change must be factored in, this task becomes doubly complicated. 
As previously mentioned, most national social security programmes are financed from current 
national revenue. Specifically, a certain portion of national revenue, normally collected through a 
combination of mandated social security contributions and taxes, is redistributed to finance 
benefits and services. Broadly speaking, projections about how much revenue should be 
collected, and to whom and in what amounts it should be disbursed, are based on assessments of 
the ratio of working-age population to the total non-active or dependant population (both young 
and old). It is clear that major changes to population age structures, which will significantly alter 
the “young” and “old”, but not necessarily the total, dependency ratio on a longer-term basis, 
demand that the manner in which social security programmes are financed, and the decisions 
about how revenue is disbursed, be revisited. As evidenced since at least the 1950s, the challenge 
for social security programmes lies with the observation that the political economy of social 
security reform is often out of step with evolving demographic structures and the pace of 
population dynamics. 
Posing a further challenge to policy-makers is the uncertainty regarding possible changes in 
individual behaviour. For example, despite the certainty that populations in nearly all countries 
are ageing, there is less certainty about how many “older” citizens are likely to remain active in 
the labour market if given the opportunity to do so.
8
                                                 
8. For many low- and middle-income countries in particular, the preoccupying concern is not one of how to increase 
the employment levels of older workers; rather, it is how to reduce high levels of youth unemployment and 
underemployment. 
  To address this uncertainty, OECD 
countries have employed various policy tools to keep older workers working. These tools include   12 
raising the pensionable age, increasing the number of years of work required to be eligible for a 
full pension, and tightening the eligibility conditions for receiving an early pension. Linking 
benefit entitlements more closely to personal contribution records, either through the use of 
defined contribution plans or notional defined contribution systems, ostensibly with the aim of 
encouraging individuals to work longer to earn higher benefits, is another. As the evidence from 
mandatory individual accounts in Latin America and elsewhere has revealed,
9
In many countries the average age at which workers exit employment is much younger than the 
legal pensionable age. This behaviour pattern became rooted in the 1970s when it was 
encouraged in many countries as a means of responding to high levels of unemployment. In a 
positive development for social security finances, between 2001 and 2007, the general trend in 
the EU reversed, and saw a rise in the average age at which workers exit employment, from age 
59.9 to age 61.2 (EC, 2009, Table 9). However this is still lower than age 65, the most common 
pensionable age for women and men in EU Member States. Worldwide, a majority of countries 
apply the same pensionable age for women and men, and others such as Australia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and the United Kingdom are gradually raising that of women to equal 
that of men (SSA and ISSA, various years). Changes to family structures, cultural values, 
employment patterns and women’s access to education as well as  improvements in life 
expectancy all bring into question the practice of women retiring earlier than men. Lower 
retirement ages for women, but longer life expectancy in retirement (and, possibly, widowhood), 
  defined 
contribution plans have not met expectations about their ability to encourage workers to 
contribute more to social security. In addition to unsatisfactory investment returns and high 
administration costs, low levels of contributions have contributed to the fact that many 
mandatory individual account systems provide inadequate benefits. This problem is particularly 
difficult for low-income and irregular earners, groups that often include a disproportionately high 
number of women (ISSA, 2010b). More generally, and despite these and other approaches and 
adjustments introduced by countries, older workers often use alternative “social security” routes 
to exit early from the workforce: e.g. disability and unemployment benefits. 
                                                 
9. For an assessment of the experience of Chile, see Berstein, Larraín and Pino (2005). For an assessment of the 
experience of Kazakhstan, see Becker et al. (2009.   13 
combined with women’s often more fragmented and less-well-paid employment histories, and 
thus lower levels of social security contributions, all add up to a greater risk of women living 
alone in poverty in old age (ISSA, 2010a).  
If the EU trend in the rise in the average age at which workers exit employment is followed more 
generally, this will be important for at least two reasons. First, the continuing activity of older 
workers is likely to defer, and possibly reduce, their need for financial support through social 
security systems. If engaged in paid employment, they will also continue to contribute to social 
security. Second, a higher level of labour force activity will bolster national economic output, 
thus strengthening fiscal receipts that in turn will support public expenditures including those 
directed to tax-financed social security programmes. On these grounds, it becomes important to 
better gauge the likely success of policy initiatives that, on one hand, seek to remove the legal 
and cultural barriers that often prevent older workers from remaining active and, on the other 
hand, that seek to influence individual behaviour by encouraging older workers to defer 
retirement. A further related question is the degree to which improvements in health indicators 
and a greater emphasis on preventive primary health initiatives will enable healthier “active” 
ageing (which would be abetted by a health and safety framework and re-modelled work 
processes tailored to the needs of older workers). As labour markets become ever-more 
globalized, a final consideration is the kind of work that will be available for younger and older 
workers alike. Even prior to the global downturn, labour market trends were moving towards 
more precarious and vulnerable employment, with increases in temporary and part-time work 
and informality. For all countries, the longer-term impacts of these developments are likely to be 
to the  detriment of social security and public finances and the adequacy of individuals’ 
contributory and tax-financed benefits. 
Of course, regardless of how these developments evolve, sustaining national economic output – 
which has a positive spin-off for social security financing – depends on more than labour force 
effort. Other factors that contribute to economic output include the level and type of investment 
made by owners of productive assets; the time frame over which companies seek to see returns 
on investment; the level of health and education of the population; the level, type, and incidence 
of taxes; government interest rate policy; exchange rate policy; innovation in technologies and 
organizational processes; and, of course, the international economic environment. This list of   14 
intervening elements acts to remind us that in seeking feasible policy solutions to the challenges 
of demographic change, all policy, including social security policy, must be designed 
strategically as part of a coherent whole. 
Demographic change implies not only a need to ensure adequate financing in future, but may 
also require a political renegotiation of the social contract. For the success of the latter, the nature 
and strength of political will, and the importance to be accorded to truly inclusive and 
participatory social dialogue, may be determinative. Renegotiating the social contract poses a 
number of questions, such as how might evolving demographic structures, involving a relative 
increase in the older population compared to that of the younger population, impact political 
decisions regarding the relative distribution through social security programmes of national 
income across generations? In ageing societies, will there be less need to invest in family 
benefits programmes? Or, might some countries favour greater investment in family programmes 
as part of orchestrated efforts to support families with young children? Although there is little 
evidence to suggest that generous family benefit programmes alone lead to higher rates of 
fertility (ISSA, 2010c), the need to bolster human capital formation to support future higher 
national economic output and, in some countries, the imperative to allay geo-political concerns 
over population decline may strengthen political support for family benefits programmes. 
Another question is how might the demographic shift towards older societies impact the future 
role of social solidarity vis-à-vis individual responsibility in the design of social security 
systems? For most countries, all reforms that may lead social security to reduce the role of social 
solidarity imply a deliberate policy choice. However, it remains to be seen whether such a 
decision might hinge as much on the reduced financial capacities of States to ensure continuing 
levels of public provision as it might on the strength of any ideological arguments to promote 
individual responsibility.  Again, there is uncertainty. Clearly, the significant degree of 
uncertainty in many countries about the rate at which the global economy will grow in the short 
to medium term, which will impact the space for fiscal manoeuvring by States, will have a 
bearing on all of the above. This is of particular relevance for developing countries that will most 
probably confront the challenge of growing old before growing rich. Significantly, by 2040, 
projections suggest that 75  per cent of the global population aged 65 or older will live in 
developing countries (ESA, 2009). However, despite these uncertainties, one assertion that can   15 
be made with a degree of assurance is that all countries will develop social security solutions that 
are specific to, and shaped by, their own institutional history, culture and values. 
Identifying and addressing the challenges of demographic change 
A first objective of this special issue is to present substantive papers that discuss all of the above 
as well as broader, related topics with the aim of highlighting the challenges of demographic 
change for social security that are already arising and anticipating others  that will become 
prominent soon. 
All countries have some form of institutional social security. In practice, the scale and scope of 
these social security programmes vary. In OECD countries social security provision is typically 
comprehensive (with provisions for old age, disability, survivorship, maternity, work injury and 
occupational diseases, unemployment, family allowances, medical benefits, and for a growing 
number of countries, long-term care) and universal (ostensibly, covering 100 per cent of the 
target population). In contrast, social security coverage in lower-income countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia may extend to less than ten per cent of the population and may provide 
coverage against a limited number of contingencies (e.g. old age, disability, survivorship, and 
work injury). Between these two extremes, a majority of countries have intermediate levels of 
coverage in terms of the risks that are covered and the proportion of the population that has 
access to such protection. On the basis of global estimates, it is thought that only 20 per cent of 
the world’s working-age population has access to adequate social security and about one-third is 
without access to any health-care coverage (ILO, 2010, p. 32; p. 43). 
Across countries, the institutional structures and mandates of social security administration vary 
as well. In some countries, social security provisions are highly centralized and managed by the 
State. In others, social security is institutionally fragmented according to the covered risk or 
geographic region and the State may be but one stakeholder in a context that includes civil-
society and market-based provision. Alongside these institutional factors, public attitudes and 
expectations and political choices about the aims of social security programmes, and not least the 
relative balance of the roles of social solidarity and individual responsibility in pursuing these 
aims, also differ.   16 
These differences and preferences, even if only of a relative nature, all act to define the 
characteristic features of national social security provision. Nonetheless, and despite often 
significant national specificities, social security programmes worldwide are confronted by a 
number of common challenges. Of these, the demographic shift to ageing societies is one of the 
most important. The identification of common policy challenges facing social security 
programmes is important, because it may permit the development and sharing of possible 
common policy lessons and the identification of good practices to inform possible responses. 
Nevertheless, these steps alone are rarely sufficient to effect change, which typically requires 
some degree of political negotiation and compromise. As the historic 2010 health care reform in 
the United States firmly underlines, the political economy of social security reform is often slow 
and difficult. 
The observation that the reform of social security programmes is seldom, if ever, a “quick-fix” 
presents a paradox: a common assertion found across the papers in this issue is one of a need for 
a greater sense of urgency in policy reform. This is not done to provoke panic or to scaremonger. 
Rather, it is based on the matter-of-fact assessment that the “world is entering substantially 
uncharted waters regarding the size of its elderly population” (Bloom, Canning and Fink, 2010, 
p. 297). By entering into such uncharted waters, there is a pressing need for new thinking that 
can inspire policy-making and practice. Although population ageing is the product of declining 
fertility as well as increased longevity, combined with the dynamic evolution of past variations 
in birth and death rates – and is thus a phenomenon that impacts all generations – public old-age 
pension systems remain the cornerstones of most national social security systems. For these 
reasons, a recurrent theme – which is addressed directly through two national case studies – is 
the priority given to the need for new thinking to guide efforts to better ensure adequate income 
security for the elderly. 
Of course, in any search for new policy thinking, a first challenge is to acknowledge that there is 
indeed a problem. In this regard, the case of the Russian Federation presented by Nicholas 
Eberstadt and Hans Groth is illustrative: Russia’s future difficulties in financing all aspects of 
social security remain widely unrecognized. In their search for responses, Eberstadt and Groth 
suggest that Russia pushes the challenges of financing and delivering social security to the 
“frontier”, since all the current policy palliatives proposed for dealing with ageing societies do   17 
not sit easily in the Russian context. Eberstadt and Groth focus on Russia’s demographic crisis 
and the implications it holds for the ability of the Russian government (or the Russian people 
through their own efforts) to generate enough funds to provide a reasonable level of old-age 
economic security. One factor that adds significantly to the problem of Russia having a 
moderately ageing society is that Russians are disproportionately less healthy than residents of 
other countries at similar – and even at much lower – levels of income. Thus, a given ratio of 
working-age to non-working-age people will not be accompanied by as high a share of workers 
as in other countries. The authors’ analysis also concludes that revenues from oil production will 
be inadequate to finance pensions for Russia’s elderly. Although the arguments presented focus 
on pensions, the authors point out that the same factors that will make it difficult to deliver 
adequate pensions also mean that other aspects of social protection will also be difficult to fulfil. 
Within the scope of this issue, Eberstadt and Groth can only begin to address the possible policy 
options: reducing the mortality rate of working-age individuals, finding a way to strengthen 
higher education, and fundamentally reforming institutions and economic policies. The Russian 
case is salutary in that it discusses issues of the urgency, as well as of the policy complexity, of 
responding to the challenges for social security systems brought about by demographic change. 
In the second national case study, David Bloom, Ajay Mahal, Larry Rosenberg, and Jaypee 
Sevilla discuss ageing and economic security issues in the context of India. They first review the 
various factors that are affecting the ability of India’s elderly to rely on traditional family ties to 
ensure their well-being, and the fact that the fraying of such ties, in conjunction with increased 
longevity, has led to an increased risk of the elderly falling into poverty. They highlight the 
particular risks endured by low-income workers (including a majority of the informal sector), 
migrants, and women, with respect to both pension coverage and health insurance. After 
explaining the array of types of contributory and tax-financed (mandatory and voluntary) pension 
and other social programmes countries can adopt, they discuss these from a holistic social 
protection perspective with particular reference to India. They also look for lessons India’s 
experience may hold for other countries. Most saliently, an assessment is provided of India’s 
experiences in implementing social protection programmes, with important consideration given 
to the efficiency gains to be gleaned from appropriate public-private partnerships and capital 
investments in information and communication technology (ICT) platforms. ICT is perceived as 
vital to enabling programmes to improve the quality of benefits and services to better meet the   18 
needs of individuals within heterogeneous population groups. However, India still faces a 
number of difficult challenges with regard to programme implementation, not least of which is 
the human resource challenge of a shortage of suitably qualified staff in a number of key 
positions. 
This last issue – the human resource challenge – is more fully investigated by a contribution 
addressing the ageing of public-sector workforces in OECD Member States, a process that will 
see the imminent departure into retirement of significant proportions of staff of all grades in 
public-sector institutions, including social security administrations. Roddy McKinnon calls 
attention to this urgent problem: the public-sector workforce, including that of social security 
agencies, is ageing rapidly, and insufficient efforts are being undertaken to replace workers who 
will be retiring soon. A compounding factor is that large numbers of employees whose 
experience would ordinarily make them the prime candidates for moving into the senior 
positions that are soon to be vacated by long-standing employees are themselves roughly as old 
as their superiors; so they, too, will be retiring soon. In this connection, alternative policy 
responses such as the mentoring of lower-level employees may be useful in helping train staff to 
fill upcoming vacancies. McKinnon uses data from Ireland and Belgium to concretize the case 
that the public-sector workforce will lose not only top managers but public servants of all grades 
in the coming years, including the human resource management staff tasked to address this major 
staffing challenge. Building on practices from New Zealand, he suggests a broad approach to the 
hiring, retention and development of staff that adds flexibility to labour practices with the goal of 
ensuring continuing service quality. The overall outlook appears to be uncertain, and it may 
already be too late to implement some of the potentially most useful measures. A case is made 
for the International Social Security Association (ISSA) to use its networks and platforms for 
information dissemination to play a useful role in continuing to call attention to this problem and 
the need to act soon in response to it. Of particular pertinence are McKinnon’s questions about 
political will and politically driven decision-making. 
Political will is also important when addressing the many different challenges of meeting the 
social security needs of migrants. The manner in which the subject of migrants and social 
security is normally framed has shifted. The debate about migrants has moved  beyond the 
narrow and decidedly self-interested national question of what migrants can do for the   19 
betterment of social security systems in societies that are ageing to one that is more balanced and 
which actively includes the policy objective of defining what social security systems can do to 
offer better social protection for the increasing number of international migrants. Previously, and 
most commonly in Europe, there was a suggestion that increases in the flow of international 
immigrants of working age would smooth the age distribution of ageing societies, increase 
labour supply and strengthen the finances of social security systems. However, “in a context of 
widespread institutional and social constraints on immigration, the magnitude of the increases 
needed to smooth the age distribution is inordinately large and not, as a practical matter, likely to 
be a decisive response to population ageing” (Bloom, Canning and Fink, 2010, p. 322). In large 
part, it is on this basis that policy arguments in more-aged societies are emphasizing the 
necessity of retaining a greater number of older workers in the workforce (where workers are 
physically capable of so doing), and doing so for longer. 
In the global South in particular, many migrants are chronically poor and frequently have no 
rights to social security in either the “sending” or “receiving” country. In this regard Rachel 
Sabates-Wheeler and Johannes Koettl offer a disquieting picture of the plight of migrants in 
relation to their ability to benefit from social protection programmes in their host country. They 
describe the limited extent to which migrants are protected by bilateral or international 
agreements that allow them to benefit from some social security arrangements. Not only with 
pensions, but also in the case of other programmes meant to help the poor, migrants are often 
deemed ineligible. Particularly in the case of South-South migrants, not only do contributory 
social security programmes (e.g. social insurance schemes and national provident funds) often 
cover a small minority of workers, but earned rights are frequently not portable across borders or 
between different types of schemes. The consequent inability of migrants to benefit fully (or, 
often, at all) from the programmes that are in place in the country of origin and in the host 
country detracts significantly from their well-being and their security. Certain subsets of 
migrants, including women, are particularly disadvantaged. The authors point out that in many 
low-income countries, the absence of basic coverage for the majority of citizens and weak 
institutional capacity to operate social programmes is, in the first instance, a more fundamental 
problem than the lack of portability of rights to benefits. They conclude that South-South 
migration needs to be understood as being significantly different from North-North migration,   20 
where the social protection issues are much more tractable. But for all migrants, countries can act 
to ensure certain benefits and rights. 
Social security is not only a matter of access to legally-defined benefits and rights, it is about 
shared values and goals and how these influence the choices societies make in allocating their 
finite resources to different population groups and cohorts. For all countries considering the 
nature of what is commonly referred to as the intergenerational bargain, the strong likelihood of 
revisiting the “share of the pie” accorded to each generation implies that a trade-off must be 
made, with relative winners and losers. The intergenerational bargain is characterized by flows 
that predominantly come from governments (e.g. for social security, education, and other public 
transfers), markets (which facilitate the accumulation of assets) and families (which provide 
economic support to children in all societies and to the elderly in many). It is against this 
background that Andrew Mason, Ronald Lee, and Sang-Hyop Lee explore how population 
ageing affects intergenerational flows (which are affected by demographic shifts, differences in 
labour income patterns and their determinants, spending on health, and spending on human 
capital) and the contrasting institutional approaches to such flows around the world. The 
direction of these flows used to be almost entirely toward children, but the worldwide trend 
toward greater longevity, the development of financial markets, and longer periods of retirement 
have led to a redirection of intergenerational flows toward the elderly. The authors build on data 
from National Transfer Accounts of an array of countries that differ from one another 
economically and demographically and that have chosen different policies regarding 
intergenerational transfers. They present a set of charts that show the different patterns of 
production and consumption over the lifecycle and the manner in which these patterns differ 
across countries. The methodology used involves a careful examination of old-age and total 
dependency ratios, and leads to a set of alternative projections of these ratios based on different 
lifecycle scenarios. The authors suggest that new labour and economic policies that take into 
account demographic realities will be useful in countering concerns about intergenerational 
equity and a possible slowing of economic growth. 
Drawing together many of the important threads of discussion running through the articles that 
comprise the major part of this special issue, the contribution from Sarah Harper provides a 
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institutions, and of individuals, to adapt to the non-demographic as well as demographic 
challenges of an ageing world. Her policy conclusions make the case for a holistic public policy 
approach to the social, economic, labour market and health care challenges that are expected to 
accompany population ageing. Henceforth, just as public  social security and health care 
institutions should be more appropriately integrated with mechanisms of private and family 
transfers, so too there will there be a heightened need for all individuals to be aided by public 
policy interventions, as and when these are deemed appropriate, that support access to 
employment opportunities, promote active ageing and life-long learning and which encourage 
preventive approaches to life-style choices and the use of health care. Harper argues that the 
building blocks for delivering financial security and health and care policies to address 
population ageing are already in place in many countries. To an important degree, these policies 
are framed by what Harper identifies as national collective goals. The implication, however, is 
that the manner in which these building blocks are stacked in the future, ostensibly to address the 
many, broad challenges of population ageing, may continue to be framed by collective goals 
defined by a previous era. In spite of this, the adaptation that Harper argues as essential includes 
the likely shouldering of a greater share of income risk by individuals, which necessarily will be 
accompanied by the development of alternative and/or complementary institutional mechanisms. 
However, such change is not expected to herald an overall reduction in the role of the State in 
ensuring the healthy functioning of national social protection systems. 
That the role of the State is expected to remain integral to social security in the future is a key 
policy message to emerge from this special issue. In the immediate term, however, in order to 
better respond to the current and emerging substantive policy challenges that confront social 
security, more and better data and analysis, as well as more institutional collaboration, is sorely 
required. For this reason, a second broad objective of this special issue is to support the objective 
of improved data collection and analysis and the fostering of institutional collaboration. Many of 
the contributions draw attention to the importance of enhancing capacities to develop 
comparative cross-national data, not least to support increasingly systematic and coordinated 
efforts to first identify and then inform policy-actors about common challenges and to distil out 
pertinent policy lessons. Standing out in this regard is the final authored contribution to this 
special issue by Jinkook Lee, which focuses specifically on the development of data sets on 
pensions and health care provision.   22 
Lee’s detailed description of surveys of the elderly around the world provides a very efficient 
path for grasping their scope and the differences among them, and is illustrative of the use to 
which coordinated collection of cross-country data is being put. The importance of this set of 
efforts  stems from the fact that carefully harmonized data –  whose collection depends on 
extensive communication among the different teams carrying out surveys – makes possible in-
depth, cross-country, comparative research about the social, economic, and health status of the 
elderly, and the determinants of that status. The inclusion of extensive, well-harmonized 
questions on health in these surveys underlines both the importance and the feasibility of using 
cross-country data to approach the public policy challenges of ageing societies from a holistic 
perspective. The data analysis emerging from such efforts will be available to inform the design 
of programmes that seek to ensure the well-being of the elderly in a highly varied array of 
situations. Lee makes clear that the effort to achieve cross-country consistency in the data will be 
very useful to decision-makers. 
As a further contribution towards improving data sharing, this special issue also presents a small 
statistical appendix of global, regional and national demographic and social security indicators to 
accompany the papers. The purpose of the appendix is twofold. First, the data are meant to 
complement and support the authored articles. Second, it provides a stand-alone reference source 
of key data, as well as of principal data sources, that will permit readers of the Review to further 
develop their own study of the numerous cross-cutting policy issues presented. Taken together, 
the development, improvement, and sharing of data is expected to contribute positively to 
improving the transparency of all social security programmes among all stakeholders. This, in 
turn, should contribute further to building trust in institutions, including public and private social 
security bodies. 
Looking forward to the coming decades, all efforts to create better performing and increasingly 
integrated national systems of social protection imply a requirement for stronger governance and 
continuing heavy State involvement. This is likely to be especially so as regards decisions about 
the allocation of public finance, in particular to those deemed most in need. Although the full 
extent of all aspects of the demographic challenge for social security remain to be fully defined 
and understood (a task to which this set of papers seek to  contribute), it is clear that the 
sustainable delivery to individuals, households and families of adequate social protection will   23 
require political will, evidence-based policy-making and, no less important, appropriately 
designed, equipped and professionally-staffed social security administrations. 
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